The project

Jerusalem, despite its unique multicultural tradition, remains deeply affected by political conflict and ethnic antagonism. Since 1967 the so called Jerusalem question has developed into one of the most complex problems of the modern Middle East. Not only it become a core matter of difficult, not to say unfeasible, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations but also developed into socio-political polarisation and antagonism between Jewish and Palestinian inhabitants of the city.

 

Of significance is the legal and diplomatic status of the city. In this respect, both Israel and Palestine put up contradictory claims. Israel regards Jerusalem as its inseparable part wile itself as the only legitimate sovereign entitled to rule the city. Palestinians, from their part, regard eastern part of the Jerusalem  (East Jerusalem – EJ) as an occupied territory that should be a part of the future Palestinian state. Palestinian position has been supported by the United Nations (UN) who unambiguously declared EJ as an occupied Palestinian land.[i] Notwithstanding UNs’ rejection of Israeli Israel has been capable of developing ‘facts on the ground policy’ and consolidate its de facto sovereignty.[ii]

The problem has become particularly relevant in the light of Camp David Summit (11-25 July 2000) failure. Not only did the talks failed to settle Jerusalem’s status but turned out to be fruitless enough to undermine the peace process in general, hence strengthened Israeli de facto[iii]  sovereignty as a consequence.

Above all, however, since the very beginning of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations Israel has been gradually reinforcing its power over Jerusalem through a policy of shaping an ethnic landscape and cultural heritage of the city as well as by strategically motivated isolation of EJ Palestinians (hereafter: EJP) from their compatriots living in the so called territories.[iv] The consequences of Israeli policies are twofold: lesser chances for a current status quo alternation and  consequently a greater pressure on EJP to accept Israeli regime.

The impasse deepened in the recent years. Since B. Netanyahu assumed Prime Minister’s office[v] the idea of negotiations hasn’t even been on the table. A forthcoming progress in unlikely, particularly when recognizing the fact the negotiations deadlock has not hampered Israeli presence in the city.

The continuity of status quo however is not able to secure conditions that could contribute to the conflict resolution. Even if Israeli efforts to settle the status through the ‘facts on the ground policy’ would end up with a successful power consolidation they are unlikely to defuse the conflict in general.[vi] Due to a variety of reasons … Firstly, persistence of Jerusalem polarization can be partly attributed to the ethnocratic nature of Israeli regime. In this sense the polarization is perceived as a direct consequence of ethnocratic pattern that structurally privileges one ethnic (Jewish) nation contributing to social inequality. [vii] Noteworthy, since when ethnocracy has been the very part of the Israeli collective state identity it can be supposed that Jerusalem ethnic polarization will not be defused but will drift toward further intensification. [viii]

Secondly, the polarisation is also maintained due to Palestinian radicalism. Despite Israeli efforts to isolate Jerusalem Palestinians from Palestinian nationalism an impingement of Palestinian national institutions, radical palestinianism maintained present. Since it has been on the rise independently from propaganda of ‘old guard’ Palestinian leadership it can be expected that its existence would not be ephemeral.

These phenomena are particularly challenging for Palestinian Jerusalem Christians (hereafter: PJCh). It goes without saying that since the indigenous Jerusalem Christian community is relatively small[ix] its existence can be easily affected by policies altering ethnic balance or escalating political conflict. This problem is exemplified by a high rate of PJCh emigration which is a response to the political instability.[x]

PJCh however are not passive victims. They possess significant institutional potential, as well as distinctly defined group identity. Also they are a group that clearly articulates own preferences and aspirations, including those concerning problems of Jerusalem status and its negotiations. Political polarisation in Jerusalem has become a serious challenge for advocacy as well as political and religious agendas of Jerusalem Patriarchates representing Christian communities. Beginning from the early 90’s Jerusalem Patriarchs have not hesitated to issue significant, bold statements condemning Israeli policies. Particularly important, in this context, have been joint statements of patriarchs as they helped to unite and conceptualize Christian position toward Israeli presence in the city.

The above context incited me to undertake a research which aim was twofold. Firstly, its task was to explore PJCh’ preferences when it comes to Jerusalem status. I approached this questions as a relevant tool of mapping PJCh’ attitude toward Israeli ethnic policy as well as a way of recognizing PJCh’ stance on Israeli de facto sovereignty and preferred state affiliation.

 

The research considered following status alternatives: ‘unified’ Jerusalem as Israeli capital being under full sovereignty of Israel; ‘unified’ Jerusalem as Palestinian capital being under full sovereignty of Palestine; territorial division of sovereignty with hard borders between western (Israeli) and eastern (Palestinian) parts of the city with both parts being Israeli and Palestinian capitals respectively; ‘unified’ Jerusalem being placed under authority of a sovereign international regime; ‘unified’ Jerusalem being a joint capital of two states with a functional division of sovereignty between Israel and Palestine; maintenance of the present status quo.

The second purpose of the study was to explore PJCh’ opinion on hitherto undertaken negotiations. In this regard I asked if PJCh perceived Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as contributing to their collective needs. I also asked what were PJCh’ opinion on the involvement of the churches in the negotiation process as well as whether PJCh’ preferences on the status of Jerusalem were in accordance with political agenda promoted by Jerusalem patriarchs.

These problems are not new, still I did have a feeling that it hadn’t been approached by the previous researches. Even though the problems of Jerusalem status or Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have been widely discussed, the issue of PJCh’ perspective regarding the future of the city hasn’t been yet explored. Similarly despite a rich experience of a research in the field ethnic relations in Israel[xi] or a socio-political profile of Christians in Israel and Palestine[xii], the specific problem of PJCh’ attitude toward political developments concerning Jerusalem hasn’t been yet adequately researched. That was a reason that I felt that there was a need for a more precise study.

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[i] For a summary of UN stand on Jerusalem status see: International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory opinion of 9 Jul. 2004, par. 78.

[ii] De facto designate an action happening in practice and as such is used in contrast to de iure which refers to a legal situation. In the context of Jerusalem the de facto sovereignty status is related to the Israeli jurisdiction executed as a consequence of an armed conflict, hence, limited by the law of the belligerent occupation. The main limitation of the current de facto status is a prohibition of annexation, since occupation itself is limited by its temporary character. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Commentary, J. Pictet (ed.), Geneve 1952. For the summary of UN standpoint on EJ status see: International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, paras. 70 - 78.

[iii] De facto designate an action happening in practice and as such is used in contrast to de iure which refers to a legal situation. In the context of Jerusalem the de facto sovereignty status is related to the Israeli jurisdiction executed as a consequence of an armed conflict, hence, limited by the law of the belligerent occupation. The main limitation of the current de facto status is a prohibition of annexation, since occupation itself is limited by its temporary character.

[iv] The territories – the Gaza Strip and the West Bank

[v] 31 March 2009.

[vi] M. Amiraw, The Jerusalem Syndrome: The Palestinian-Israeli Battle for the Holy City, Portland 2009, p. 103–105

[vii] O. Yiftachel , Understanding ‘ethnocratic’ regimes: the politics of seizing contested territories, „Political Geography”, no 23, 2004, 647–676.

[viii] As argued by O. Yiftachel a conflict between dominating majority and discriminated minority is a permanent feature of each ethnocracy, as it is party generated by an minority’s ability to express dissatisfaction and channel collective needs, O. Yiftachel, ibidem.

[ix] From 1967 the number of Palestinians in Jerusalem dropped from 10813 (Israeli census) to the level below 10000. The current number of PJCh is estimated at 8000-10000, see: Palestinian Christians, Fact Sheet, Jerusalem Inter-Church Centre Report, May 2009, https://pief.oikoumene.org/en/issues/jerusalem (02.09.2015); B. SABELLA, R. SOUDAH (Eds.) The Sabeel survey on Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and Israel, Jerusalem  2006, p. 49; B. H. KARTVEIT, Dilemmas of Attachment: Identity and Belonging Among Palestinian Christians, Leiden et al. 2014, p. 218.

[x] The problem has been illustrated by the latest research of B. Sabella on emigration of PJCh. 62% of the respondents of his research expressed the wish to emigrate. One third of the respondents indicated that they know of an entire family of relatives, neighbours or friends who have emigrated during the last five years. The majority of the respondents indicated lack of employment opportunities, Israeli laws and measures and bad political situation as a main reasons for emigration. B. Sabella, Palestinian Christians in Jerusalem, Results of a Survey – April 2014, not printed.

[xi] See: S. Munayer, The Ethnic Identity of Palestinian Arab Christian Adolescents in Israel, Oxford 2005; S. Smooha, The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel,  Haifa 1984; N. Rouhana, Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State, New Haven - Conn, 1997.

[xii] See: Arab Christians in Israel, Facts, Figures and Trends, J. Mansour (ed.), Bethlehem 2012; Palestinian Christians. Facts, Figures and Trends, M. Raheb et al (eds.), Bethlehem 2008; The Sabeel survey on Palestinian Christians in the West Bank and Israel, B. Sabella, R. Soudah (eds.), Jerusalem 2006.